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The present article highlights important concepts of personality including stability issues
from the perspective of situational demands and stability over the life-course. Following
this more introductory section, we argue why individual differences in primary emotional
systems may represent the phylogenetically oldest parts of human personality. Our
argumentation leads to the need to increasingly consider individual differences in the
raw affects/emotions of people to understand human personality in a bottom–up
fashion, which can be coordinated with top–down perspectives. In support of this idea,
we also review existing evidence linking individual differences in primal emotions as
assessed with the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales and the widely accepted
Big Five Model of Personality. In this context, we provide additional evidence on the link
between primal emotions and personality in German and Chinese sample populations.
In short, this article addresses evolutionary perspectives in the evaluation of human
personality, highlighting some of the ancestral emotional urges that probably still control
variations in the construction of human personality structures. Moreover, we address
how individual differences in primary emotional systems can illuminate linkages to major
human psychopathologies and the potential advantages and disadvantages of carrying
a certain personality trait within certain cultural/environmental niches.
Keywords: emotions, personality, Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience, primary emotional systems
DEFINING PERSONALITY
Many definitions of personality exist and we will not aspire to present them all in this paper.
Instead, we will seek to construct a synthetic synopsis of various major definitions: Personality
describes stable individual differences in cognitive, emotional and motivational aspects of mental
states that result in stable behavioral action (especially emotional) tendencies of humans and other
animals, but thoughts remain almost impossible to study in animals (in contrast, the study of
emotional behaviors and feelings is straightforward (Panksepp, 1998, 2015a,b). Most theorists, in
the context of cognition, refer to personality factors being manifested in stable thinking patterns.
The stability issue of personality has been discussed in two areas: (i) time stability and (ii)
stability over situations. Many longitudinal studies demonstrated that personality is rather stable,
in particular starting from early adulthood, when upper brain regions have matured— e.g., when
the prefrontal cortex is able to hold a tight grip on emotions arising from phylogenetically
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old brain areas (see a short overview by Costa and McCrae, 1994;
McCrae and Costa, 1994). A review by Edmonds et al. (2008,
p. 410) also emphasized the conclusion that personality is stable
over time. For instance, they write “in the absence of an energetic
attempt to change your personality... in 10 years you will most
likely see the same person that you see now.”
Of course, the situational-stability perspective on human
personality is somewhat different than the time-stability topic.
For many decades, the personality/consistency paradox gave
researchers headaches (Mischel, 2004), because persons do not
behave as stable across different situations as many scientists
originally proposed. The personality paradox has been partly
solved by Mischel and Shoda (1995) and Mischel (2004) using
so called if-then functions. By using such if-then functions it
becomes better explainable why someone does not behave with
consistent personality patterns in any imaginable situation. These
if-then functions take into account that stability of a person is
dependent on situational characteristics. This can be illustrated
by a person showing on the one hand stable conscientious
behavior at the job, but on the other hand that may not
translate to the home environment. So if a person is on the
job, then he/she acts conscientious. If a person is at home, then
he/she acts not conscientious (or comparably less than on the
job). Ultimately this means that same scores in a self-report
measure for personality may relate to different environmental
mind sets, which may cause confusion when a person is filling
in a questionnaire (e.g., I am thinking of my conscientious
behavior when doing the dishes). See for more and additional
detailed elaborations on the above mentioned examples in the
latent state-trait-theory, which “starts from the premise that
human cognition, emotion, and behavior depend systematically
on characteristics of the person (traits), characteristics of the
situation, and the interaction between person and situation”
(Steyer et al., 1999; p. 391).
So far, we have noted that personality refers to stable individual
differences in emotionality, motivation and cognition resulting
in behavioral action patterns. Now, we would like to focus on
the emotional parts of personality, because we are convinced that
emotional parts are (i) the evolutionary oldest parts of human
personality and (ii) drive human personality and behavior in
a bottom–up fashion. This will be explained by a short review
of what we have already published on this topic/mentioned
elsewhere (see Davis and Panksepp, 2011; Montag, 2014; Montag
and Reuter, 2014) which will then be deepened and enlarged by
new data giving additional insights into the role of emotions into
personality. Before we will follow that path in our article, we
would first shortly highlight why the study of human personality
is of tremendous importance.
THE IMPORTANCE OF EMOTIONS IN
THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY
Until today many researchers are joining this fascinating research
endeavor trying to understand why humans differ from each
other and even in trying to find answers to questions such as
“Why am I the type of person, I am?”. So one would think that
human curiosity would be enough to answer why humans and
many researchers are interested in this research topic. Of course
there are many other issues to consider.
Besides nourishing human curiosity there are many hard facts
showing that a better understanding of human personality is
of great importance for promoting human welfare. Potentially
the most important reason for the study of human personality
can be found in the areas of psychiatry and well-being. It has
been shown in many studies that negative emotionality, especially
with respect to the personality dimension of Neuroticism
represents a risk factor for instigating and promoting affective
disorders (Lahey, 2009). Thus we can anticipate that the
affective disentangling of the biological basis of this important
personality trait will eventually result in a better understanding
of the molecular foundations of Neuroticism as well as many
other personality disorders (Karterud et al., 2016). This might
facilitate development of new psychopharmaceuticals to better
treat affective disorders (e.g., Panksepp, 2015b, 2016). The
study of the “healthy neurotic person” may also promote our
understanding of anxiety disorders, because one can assume that
dysbalances of neurotransmitters/neuropeptides seen in many
affective disorders, will be absent or only present to a lesser
degree in healthy-normal variations of human personality. Of
course, simply focussing on the study of individual differences
in negative emotionality is a focus that is far too narrow
to understand the emotional breadth of personality. Thus,
we fear that the past has seen a too strong focus on the
study of individual differences in negative emotionality; indeed,
a better understanding of the neuro-biological/psychological
basis of positive emotionality will perhaps be of even greater
importance to make progress in the development of better
treatments for disorders characterized by negative affect,
especially depression.
Aside from some progresses in psychiatry due to personality
research, many other important life outcomes can be successfully
linked to human personality emphasizing the importance of
this research endeavor. To name a few: longevity (Jackson
et al., 2015), health behavior (Bogg and Roberts, 2004, 2013)
financial decision making (Lauriola and Levin, 2001; Bibby and
Ferguson, 2011) and job performance (Barrick and Mount,
1991).
PRIMAL EMOTIONS AS
PHYLOGENETICALLY OLDEST PART OF
HUMAN PERSONALITY?
Considering the architecture of the human brain, it becomes
obvious that individual differences in emotionality could
represent the evolutionary oldest part of human personality (a
fact that synergizes with the classical division of personality
into choleric, melancholic, phlegmatic, and sanguine types;
see Stelmack and Stalikas, 1991). Following the ideas of
MacLean’s Triune Brain Concept, the human brain can be
divided into at least three major evolutionary passages – at
minimum – layers designated as the reptilian (deep subcortical),
old-mammalian (limbic) and neo-mammalian (or neocortical)
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brain regions (MacLean, 1990). In this didactic simplification,
the reptilian brain hosts neural systems of ultimate importance
for unconscious autonomous bodily functions (e.g., breathing
and heart beat regulation) and very ancient emotions such as
FEAR, LUST, RAGE, and SEEKING, while the limbic brain,
more developed in mammals than reptiles, not only adds
additional complexities to those most ancient emotions, but
also forged neural circuits for higher social emotions such as
maternal CARE, separation-distress (PANIC) as well as social
PLAY, all of which will be described in this section. The
most recent development in mammalian, especially primate,
brain-mind evolution led to a “cortical thinking cap”, most
expansive in humans (at least as percent of body weight),
enabling us to reason, but also to cognitively regulate our
emotions. Since the primal emotions are located in the two
phylogenetically oldest layers of reptilian and mammalian brains,
individual differences in these ancient neural circuitry represent,
from our perspective, the primal foundations of the major
affective human personality dimensions, as well as those of
other animals. Of course, a great deal of cortical-cognitive
competence is permitted by neo-cortical regions, but it has
long been known that upper brain-mind regions can not
operate effectively without the genetically dictated subcortical
emotional-affective, motivation and consciousness sustaining
systems.
Until now, seven primal emotions have been identified by
Panksepp (1998, 2011—largely using deep brain stimulation
approach), which all could be of relevance to understand
human personality. Among these are four emotional
circuitries for positive emotions (SEEKING, LUST, CARE,
PLAY) and three emotional circuitries for negative emotions
(FEAR, RAGE/ANGER and SADNESS/PANIC). By means
of electrical stimulation of the mammalian brain and also
psychopharmacological challenge tests, many investigators
of brain-behavior-relationships have demonstrated that
these emotional brain systems have been highly conserved
across mammalian species, thereby making it likely that our
fellow mammalian animals also probably exhibit comparable
personality dimensions. Supporting this idea, most of the
personality traits represented in the Five Factor Model of
Personality have been observed in mammals, with dogs having
been especially well studied (Gosling and John, 1999; Gosling
et al., 2003), although Conscientiousness has been effectively
studied only in humans and chimpanzees.
Before proceeding, we would briefly discuss the primal
emotions identified through a cross-species study of subcortically
situated emotional systems. The SEEKING system is our
general purpose appetitive-exploratory-investigatory system, that
is essential for acquiring all the environmental resources needed
for survival and propagation. The LUST and CARE urges are
deeply entwined with SEEKING circuitry—thereby promoting
sexual desire and the care of offspring. LUST, in combination
with SEEKING urges, promotes sexual engagements. When the
CARE circuit is aroused, humans as well as other animals feel
an urge to nurture and protect their offspring. Arousal of this
circuit may also promote a satisfying relationship among adult
partners.
Of course, young animals must also have systems that
help them prepare for their adult emotional activities. Social
PLAY circuitry, also closely related to SEEKING urges, is of
such evolutionary importance: Without abundant pro-social
activities during development, as promoted by PLAY urges,
children may have diminished social competence in adulthood
(Pellegrini and Smith, 1998). Indeed, animal models support the
idea that a lack of early PLAY during childhood might result
in ADHD tendencies (Panksepp et al., 2003). Parenthetically,
the massive elevation of non-social SEEKING, and diminished
social PLAY, may create future social problems unique to
emerging human digital-societies: Around the globe children
are spending excessive time on smartphones, tablets, and
computer screens, which reduces natural social PLAY time. The
diminished opportunities for rough and tumble PLAY activities
may have unforeseen social consequences (see Montag et al.,
2016b).
Activities in the various primary positive and negative
emotional systems are accompanied by distinct affective feeling
states, which presumably promote different learned behavior
patterns. We now switch to the negative brain emotional
networks. Activation of the neural FEAR circuitry signals danger
and helps us escape diverse, dangerous life-threatening situations.
RAGE helps us defend our lives and other resources—but
in complex human societies, with cultural expectations about
what is deemed proper behavior, can obviously backfire. RAGE
is not only activated when we are attacked and need to
defend ourselves, but also in situations of frustration, when
access to expected reward is thwarted, including territorial
conflicts. Finally, the PANIC/SADNESS circuitry is activated
in situations of separation distress going along with feelings
of loneliness and sadness, which may eventually precipitate
depression. From an evolutionary perspective this makes sense,
as activity in the SADNESS circuit (as well as the other negative
circuitries) is accompanied by negative feelings. Humans strive
to reduce activity in these circuitries, because they simply
feel awful to varying degrees depending on the environmental
situations triggering the various emotional systems: From an
evolutionary perspective, feeling bad when left alone or losing
a loved person is an evolutionary advantageous response –
in social species, especially when individuals are very young,
being alone can be very dangerous. This ancestral survival
signal that we typically call the PANIC system (as mapped
out with deep brain stimulation) was important not only
among our ancestors, but survival and thriving in our
modern complex environment often requires social bonds
that promote cooperation that can enable social alliances.
When one is alone, whether mouse or man, it is simply
more difficult to survive, and to get through life with an
affectively positive frame of mind. Thus homo sapiens, like all
other mammals, are genetically “social animals” who actively
SEEK companionship. Therefore SEEKING and SADNESS
activities are strongly linked to each other. In depression
SEEKING activity is downregulated (the patient has no
motivation/energy) and the SADNESS circuitry shows full blown
activation (see also Panksepp, 2015b, 2016; Montag et al.,
2016c).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 April 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 464
fpsyg-08-00464 April 9, 2017 Time: 9:58 # 4
Montag and Panksepp Evolutionary Aspects of Personality
ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF
MOTIVATIONAL AND EMOTIONAL
SYSTEMS
Although the behavioral and psychological sciences have often
distinguished “motivational” and “emotional” processes,
they are highly overlapping concepts. The basic brain
motivational systems often include homeostatic processes,
such as maintenance of bodily energy (hunger), water (thirst)
and other states essential for survival, from thermal homeostasis
to micronutrients such as sodium. It is important to highlight
that such basic motivational systems may have dedicated need-
state detectors in the brain and body, but they do not have
separate “motivational systems” to acquire the needed resources.
All psychologically salient bodily need states operate through
the auspices of a general purpose SEEKING system—which
is still often called “The Brain Reward System.” In fact,
this “self-stimulation” circuitry does not directly detect any
of the specific substances needed for survival, but all the
need detectors of the body and brain operate through a
general purpose SEEKING system that motivates general
appetitive behaviors (from exploration to specific learning-
direct seeking of specific resources). In the present context,
it is important to note that there are strong evolutionary
linkages between such need detector systems in all animals
(with species-typical variations), but until recently none of these
systems have figured explicit in human personality theory. On
the other hand, the general purpose SEEKING urge, which
promotes a large variety of goal-directed behaviors, is of
great importance for personality traits such as eagerness and
enthusiasm.
One might also be tempted to ask “Are motivational or
emotional systems evolutionary older?”. Again, this is not
a productive way to proceed. All emotional systems have
strong motivational components. And systems designed
to protect the homeostatic integrity of our bodies (body-
need detectors) operate through the emotional/motivational
SEEKING system. Before neuroscience, psychology was
accustomed to focussing mainly on “conceptual kinds.”
With advances in our undestanding of the relevant evolved,
subcortical “survival systems” [which come in emotional,
homeostatic, and sensory (also interoceptive) varieties],
we are now in a better position to identify which are
most important for the emergence of a neurobiological
understanding of personality. In our estimation, the ancestral
emotional systems are most important for guiding us
toward a naturalistic understanding of human and animal
personalities, especially since they now allow a variety of
novel neurobiological predictions as opposed to just providing
cognitive-psychological-dimensional views of personality. We
think that the ever-popular Five Factor Model of Personality
currently needs some primary-process emotional grounding
in order to give a better idea of what those factors may reflect
at fundamental affective levels, which may provide better
neural understandings of the emotional foundations of human
personality.
LINKING PRIMAL EMOTIONS TO THE
FIVE FACTOR MODEL OF PERSONALITY
The Five Factor Model of Personality arguably represents
one of the most important personality models currently used
world-wide in both research and applied work settings (e.g.,
Barrick and Mount, 1991; Costa and McCrae, 1992; McCrae
and John, 1992; McCrae and Costa, 2008). It has been based
on lexical perspectives in the early psychological sciences
(Allport and Odbert, 1936; Cattell, 1943; Fiske, 1949), where
psychologists in the early 1930s/40s started to study human
language by means of factor analysis resulting in five personality
dimensions easily to be remembered with the acronym OCEAN:
Openness to Experience describes humans who are open to new
experiences (for example this could be in the domains of food,
traveling, culture), intellectual and artistic pursuits which surely
would contribute to a sense of aesthetics. Conscientiousness
describes diligent and punctual persons, who can be relied
upon. Extraverted persons are assessed on dimensions of
socially outgoingness and assertiveness. Agreeable persons
are team-players and associated with higher empathic traits
(see also Melchers et al., 2016). Finally, Neuroticism can be
characterized by being moody, emotionally unstable and anxious,
with tendencies toward depressed states.
The logic behind the lexical approach follows the convincing
idea that personality should manifest itself in human language,
which we use on a daily basis to describe ourselves and others.
Hence, the dissection of human language use with statistical tools
should reveal something about our fundamental psychological
personality traits. For instance, a person describing his or herself
as cold, unkind, selfish and uncooperative could be described by
a higher order factor of (low) Agreeableness (Goldberg, 1992).
Of note (and in contrast to older typologies in personality; see
the approach by Galen as mentioned by Stelmack and Stalikas,
1991) every person has a score on each of the already introduced
personality dimensions/traits resulting in a personality pattern
more or less unique to him/her. Humans differ on personality
continuums, which means that a person is not either extraverted
or introverted, but tends more in the one or the other direction
of the investigated continuum, often based on environmental
affordances (see also the discussion above on the stability of
personality across different situations).
The literature has also coined the cluster of OCEAN
personality dimensions as the Big Five of Personality. These
factors have been observed to appear relatively stable across
different cultures (McCrae et al., 1998; McCrae and Allik, 2002).
Of note, the Big Five and the Five Factor Model of Personality
are historically not exactly the same: The Big Five hint more
toward the original lexical analysis approach (see also Goldberg,
1992). In contrast, the Five Factor Model refers to a more explicit
model of personality, although based on the history of the lexical
analysis approach, using formulated items instead of adjectives
to assess individual differences in these personality traits
(see NEO-FFI or NEO-PI-R by McCrae and Costa, 2004). Given
the overlap in the naming of the dimensions and also in the
concepts underlying these traits, in our opinion Big Five/Five
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Factor Model of Personality can typically be used interchangably
(as is commonly done in many works).
Before we describe how the Big Five and the primary
emotional systems may be linked to each other, we would
note that there is currently no general consensus on how
many personality dimensions are needed to fully grasp human
personality. Besides the Big Five, many other (indeed various
biological) personality theories exist: For instance there are
(i) three dimensions in Eysenck’s PEN model (Psychoticism,
Extraversion and Neuroticism; Eysenck et al., 1992), (ii) three
dimensions in Gray’s revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory
(Gray and McNaughton, 2000; Leue and Beauducel, 2008;
Markett et al., 2014; Reuter et al., 2015) and (iii) four
temperament- and three character-traits in Cloninger’s extensive
model (Cloninger et al., 1993). Also, Cloninger’s model splits
personality into temperament and character. According to
Cloninger, temperament describes highly inherited personality
traits visible already in infants (clearly also being linked to
primal emotions), while character traits are shaped more by the
environment and one’s own unique learning-history as stabilized
in early adulthood.
Costa and McCrae (1993) came up with the metaphor that
the Five Factor Model of Personality somehow resembles the
Christmas tree on which each of the other personality models
can serve as “decorations.” Indeed, this seems reasonable to
the extent that the aforementioned personality traits from other
theories can often be related to one or two dimensions of
the Five Factor Model of Personality. With respect to primal
emotional systems, we would envision such a tree metaphor
rather differently. Although links between individual differences
in primal emotions and the Big Five exist (see next paragraph),
we currently have a much better neurobiological understanding
of the primal emotions than the nature of the aforementioned
“tree.” This point may become better understandable if we recall
that our key argument is that the primal emotions represent
the phylogenetically oldest part of human personality, with that
foundation driving behavior and the more cognitive aspects of
personality via a bottom–up affective developmental-learning
trajectory (Panksepp, 1998). This foundational perspective may
be able to link up with cross-species neurobiological analyses
more than top–down human-centric cognitive-linguistic views.
In the early work of Davis et al. (2003) individual emotional
differences as assessed by the Affective Neuroscience Personality
Scales (ANPS) have, for the first time, provided a cross-species
neuropsychological context that can neuropsychologically
illuminate the Big Five (see Table 1). The ANPS has been
constructed on the theoretical background of Panksepp’s
neuro-evolutionary, cross-mammalian Affective Neuroscience
(AN) theory assessing, via self-report, individual differences
in SEEKING, CARE, PLAY (positive emotions) and FEAR,
ANGER, SADNESS (negative emotions)1. Each of these
emotions represents a robust, evidence-based neuro-behavioral-
psychological tool for survival driving our actions in a bottom–up
fashion (see introduction above). Usually our cortical thinking
cap holds a tight grip over the emotional activity in these ancient
circuitries (please note, that following radical neodecortication,
animals exhibit hyper-emotionality, as in decorticate-rage).
In short, all the basic emotions survive radical decortication
of infant animals (e.g., Panksepp et al., 1994). Therefore,
pure raw affects rather seldom dominate everyday human
life. Nevertheless, everyone knows how it feels, when our
strongly driven genetic primary emotional programs are
working at full intensity, often overwhelming us (remember
situations of being profoundly terrified at the sight of danger
or purely happy when playing with someone). The ANPS
has been validated in a number of studies in the last few
years using different neuroscientific methods. Among others,
an inverse correlation between the ANGER dimension and
left amygdala volume has been demonstrated (Reuter et al.,
2009). While Felten et al. (2011) demonstrated an interaction
effect of dopaminergic polymorphisms on SADNESS, Montag
et al. (2011) showed an interaction between serotonergic and
oxytocinergic polymorphisms on SADNESS and FEAR. Recent
1Note, that LUST is not assessed with the ANPS, because it is feared that
in that kind of scale, answering personal sexuality items may promote the
emission of biased social desirable answers, thereby potentially also impacting the
psychometric quality of the remaining scales assessing the other primary emotional
systems.
TABLE 1 | Associations between the Big Five (assessed with Goldberg’s inventory) and dimensions of the ANPS in an US sample taken from Davis et al.
(2003).
SEEKING FEAR CARE ANGER PLAY SADNESS
Neuroticism −0.01 0.75 0.07 0.65 −0.12 0.68
n.s. <0.001 n.s. <0.001 n.s. <0.001
Extraversion 0.13 −0.19 0.25 −0.04 0.46 −0.21
n.s. <0.05 <0.01 n.s. <0.001 <0.01
Openness 0.47 −0.05 0.06 −0.08 0.13 −0.00
<0.001 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Agreeableness −0.01 −0.17 0.50 −0.48 0.29 −0.13
n.s. <0.05 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 n.s.
Conscientiousness −0.01 −0.24 0.12 −0.30 0.00 −0.30
n.s. <0.01 n.s. <0.001 n.s. <0.001
Note that correlations of >0.45 have been indicated by bold letters in the original publication by Davis et al. (2003). Moreover, for better comparability with Tables 2, 3 we
changed the terms Emotional Stability to Neuroticism and switched the algebraic signs accordingly. Student sample: n = 171 (50 males, 121 females).
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work by van der Westhuizen and Solms (2015) investigated
associations between dominance and the ANPS, whereas also
the testosterone to cortisol ratio was positively associated with
dominance, but with none of the ANPS dimensions. A recent
resting state fMRI study by Deris et al. (2017) observed that
functional connectivity of the basolateral amygdala (here the
seed was planted) to other brain regions can be linked to the
primal emotion of SADNESS. A study by Sindermann et al.
(2016) showed an association between the 2D:4D marker of
the hand (an indice for prenatal testosterone exposure) and
FEAR/SADNESS in female participants. Recent works relying
“only” on self-report ANPS questionnaire data investigated a link
between SEEKING and depression in stroke patients (Farinelli
et al., 2013), while others have used the ANPS in the context of
personality disorders (Geir et al., 2014; Karterud et al., 2016)
and depression patients (Montag et al., 2016c). The interest of
many researchers in the ANPS mirrors also in many available
translations such as Turkish (Özkarar-Gradwohl et al., 2014),
Spanish (Abella et al., 2011), French (Pahlavan et al., 2008;
Pingault et al., 2012), and German (Reuter et al., 2017).
Coming back to the original ANPS work by Davis et al. (2003),
but also the revised newer work by Davis and Panksepp (2011),
we see some robust correlations between the Big Five and primal
emotions. Arising from the correlation patterns in the original
works, SEEKING is robustly linked with Openness to Experience
and high PLAY goes along with higher Extraversion. High
CARE and low ANGER are associated with higher Agreeableness.
High scores on all negative emotional circuitries might underlie
Neuroticism (with strongest effects for SADNESS and FEAR). As
these associations have been derived from correlational studies,
causality on our bottom–up idea of primary emotional systems
driving human behavior/personality cannot be simply inferred
from these psychological data. Considering the architecture of
the human brain, locating primary emotional systems in the
phylogenetically oldest part of the mammalian brain, it is very
likely and logical that individual differences in these circuitries
represent the oldest part of personality and influence complex
personality traits such as the Big Five in a bottom–up fashion.
This idea becomes even more convincing, as we consider the
patterns of our cross-cultural data (in Tables 1–3): The same
associations between the Big Five/Five Factor Model2 and primal
emotional systems in three samples from different cultural
backgrounds can be observed, which speaks for a global ancestral
neuro-biological effect, because the cultural environments differ
strongly in the USA, Germany, and China. Further evidence for
the global robustness of our findings comes from the fact that
the samples did not only differ in terms of ethnic background,
but also the observed gender ratios and age. Whereas the sample
from China consists of more male than female participants, the
samples from Germany and the USA consist of more female
than male participants. This can be explained by the fact that
the recruiting process in China was conducted at a technical
university with a much higher proportion of male students,
whereas in Germany and USA among others psychology students
were recruited with a higher female ratio. Again, given the
heterogeneity of the samples with respect to culture, gender-
ratio and differences in age, quite similar correlation patterns (as
summarized in Tables 1–3) strongly point toward global trends
(note that the bold printed results are robust and would hold
for multiple testing, if we consider to replicate the seven main
2The Davis et al. (2003) study included Goldberg’s inventory to assess the Big Five,
whereas the samples from Germany and China in the present study filled in the
NEO-FFI. A study by Mooradian and Nezlek (1996) investigated the correlations
between a short version of Goldberg’s inventory and the NEO-FFI concluding:
“These results suggest that Saucier’s Mini-Markers and the NEO-FFI measure
similar, but clearly not identical constructs. Similarly labeled subscales shared
between 25 and 50% of their variance (up to 77% deattenuated)” (Mooradian and
Nezlek, 1996, p. 214).
TABLE 2 | Associations between the Five Factor Model of Personality (assessed with the NEO-FFI) and dimensions of the ANPS in a German sample.
SEEKING FEAR CARE ANGER PLAY SADNESS
Neuroticism −0.255 0.752 0.135 0.328 −0.363 0.689
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
[−0.336; −0.164] [0.716; 0.784] [0.049; 0.215] [0.255; 0.397] [−0.429; −0.290] [0.650; 0.728]
Extraversion 0.358 −0.391 0.227 −0.155 0.668 −0.305
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
[0.272; 0.430] [−0.454; −0.323] [0.148; 0.309] [−0.238; −0.076] [0.621; 0.709] [−0.366; −0.244]
Openness 0.388 −0.015 0.242 −0.019 0.041 0.157
<0.001 0.688 <0.001 0.613 0.284 <0.001
[0.308; 0.457] [−0.096; 0.067] [0.165; 0.315] [−0.097; 0.061] [−0.039; 0.125] [0.080; 0.234]
Agreeableness 0.152 −0.065 0.488 −0.405 0.331 0.010
<0.001 0.090 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.798
[0.063; 0.237] [−0.147; 0.022] [0.414; 0.558] [−0.477; −0.331] [0.255; 0.403] [−0.064; 0.092]
Conscientiousness 0.268 −0.029 0.097 −0.023 −0.006 −0.027
<0.001 0.454 0.011 0.541 0.869 0.483
[0.196; 0.342] [−0.115; 0.059] [0.012; 0.176] [−0.100; 0.061] [−0.086; 0.069] [−0.113; 0.058]
In bold letters we highlight the correlations of largest interest from the Davis et al. (2003) study. Comparable correlation patterns as in Table 1 can be observed with
the highest difference in the lower ANGER – Neuroticism association. n = 687 [212 males, 475 females; mean-age = 23.64 (SD = 6.00)], mainly students. Confidence
intervals (CIs) were calculated using bootstrap analysis (1000 samples, Bias corrected and accelerated).
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TABLE 3 | Associations between the Five Factor Model of Personality (assessed with the NEO-FFI) and dimensions of the ANPS in a Chinese sample.
SEEKING FEAR CARE ANGER PLAY SADNESS
Neuroticism −0.234 0.725 −0.095 0.401 −0.266 0.594
<0.001 <0.001 0.059 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
[−0.359; −0.110] [0.670; 0.772] [−0.220; 0.037] [0.296; 0.492] [−0.370; −0.163] [0.523; 0.658]
Extraversion 0.349 −0.461 0.353 −0.197 0.587 −0.263
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
[0.231; 0.461] [−0.548; −0.368] [0.241; 0.451] [−0.308; −0.078] [0.506; 0.658] [−0.361; −0.156]
Openness 0.395 −0.013 0.241 0.011 0.189 0.073
<0.001 0.790 <0.001 0.827 <0.001 0.147
[0.282; 0.493] [−0.110; 0.083] [0.137; 0.347] [−0.126; 0.137] [0.088; 0.289] [−0.027; 0.182]
Agreeableness 0.148 −0.273 0.382 −0.401 0.336 −0.228
0.003 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
[0.021; 0.287] [−0.385; −0.142] [0.277; 0.482] [−0.481; −0.318] [0.234; 0.430] [−0.327; −0.121]
Conscientiousness 0.381 −0.271 0.162 −0.086 0.119 −0.203
<0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.087 0.018 <0.001
[0.261; 0.492] [−0.381; −0.158] [0.041; 0.290] [−0.196; 0.038] [0.010; 0.234] [−0.314; −0.086]
In bold letters we highlight the correlations of largest interest from the Davis et al. (2003) study. Comparable correlation patterns as in Table 1 can be observed with the
highest difference in the lower ANGER – Neuroticism association. n = 394, [263 = males, 131 females; mean-age = 21.91 (SD = 2.35)], mainly students. Confidence
intervals (CIs) were calculated using bootstrap analysis (1000 samples, Bias corrected and accelerated).
correlation depicted in Tables 1–3; Bonferroni correction for
seven tests results in alphas of 0.05/7 = 0.007). Therefore, we
summarize the findings of these global trends also in Figure 1
and depict which primary emotional systems underlie each
of the Big Five of Personality. Although Conscientiousness
can be predicted from some primary emotions (in some
countries), the associations are weaker and less stable across
the samples. Moreover, Conscientiousness cannot be observed
in most mammals, therefore we refrain from the inclusion of
potential underlying primal emotions in Figure 1.
TOWARD A MODERN UNDERSTANDING
OF HUMAN PERSONALITY
At the end of this section, we will explain our current
understanding of the neuropsychological sources of human
personality as shown in Figure 2. It is common sense that
individual differences in personality are strongly influenced
by both genetics as well as diverse environmental events and
experiences [see mega-analysis by Polderman et al. (2015) which
studied more than 14 million twin pairs]. Heritability estimates
come up with about 50% of genetic influences and 50% of the
environment (as very rough estimates), which also has been
supported with comparable numbers (on average) with respect
to the here discussed primal emotional systems as assessed
with the ANPS in a recent study (Montag et al., 2016a).
It is noteworthy that twin studies are only able to estimate
the genetic and environment effects of individual differences
in personality. Given the strong homologies that exist in the
neuroanatomical and neurochemical foundations of the primary
emotional systems across different mammalian species, the
neuro-genetic effects beyond those already described in twin
studies must be very strong. It is of importance to further note
that genetics and environmental influences cannot be seen as
distinct entities, because both interact and shape together what is
happening on both molecular and molar levels, in both brain and
mind, resulting in individual differences in brain structure and
functionality. This in turn gives way to individual differences in
human personality, which are usually studied linguistically. The
study of the modulation of the so called epigenome, by including
environmental influences, will surely bring new insights also
to personality research in the coming years (e.g., see how
prosocial personality is linked to different methylation patterns
of the gene coding for oxytocin; Haas et al., 2016). In short:
the epigenome represents the area “directly above” the genetic
code—namely how the environment modifies long-term gene-
expression patterns in all of our cells, most importantly neurons
from the present perspective. Given the representation of the
vast human genome in every cell nucleus, much of the human
genome is densely packed and therefore not accessible at all
times. To oversimplify, the modulation of the epigenome opens
or closes the genome, so that various regions of animal bodies
are able to get differential (environmentally controlled) access to
information about the blueprints of any of the molecules that are
needed to build the kind of creatures that we are (e.g., McGowan
and Szyf, 2010; Heim and Binder, 2012; Toyokawa et al., 2012).
Many of the epigenetic mechanisms are still not well
understood, but it is generally agreed that bringing the study of
the epigenome to personality research (and its phylogenetically
old component primal emotions) will be an important step for
a better understanding of human personalities—in a sense, a
deeper understanding of who we are. This further strengthens
the dictum that we must better envision how both nature
and nurture, as interacting partners rather than distinct units,
create our various psychological strengths and weaknesses.
Understandably, this exciting area of research is now rapidly
expanding. We would only note that the interaction of genetics
and environment was already nicely described with early
prominent results from Caspi et al. (2003) describing how the
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FIGURE 1 | Primary emotional systems influencing the Big Five of Personality bottom–up (the associations have been derived from the most robust
correlation patterns as depicted in Tables 1–3).
risk to suffer from depression is elevated in persons who carry
both a genetic risk factor for depression and the vicissitudes of
a severe, adverse life event in childhood (for a meta-analysis of
this topic, see Karg et al., 2011). Clearly it is also of importance
to mention studies, which highlight exclusively the impact of
environmental influences (in the following mostly traumatic
experiences) on one’s own activity of primary emotional systems
manifesting in diverse areas such as one’s own mimicry and/or
vagal regulation [investigated in street boys by Ardizzi et al.
(2013) and in maltreated children by Ardizzi et al. (2016)],
emotion recognition abilities/selective attention when processing
facial emotion (Pollak and Sinha, 2002; Pollak and Tolley-Schell,
2003; Pollak et al., 2009; Scrimin et al., 2009), denial of emotions
such as sadness (in terms of lower recognition rates of sadness
in others when being a survivor of war in Sierra Leone; Umilta
et al., 2013) or interoceptive sensitivity (Ferri et al., 2013). In sum,
many studies investigated main or epistasis effects of molecular
genetic markers on temperament traits being closely linked to
primary emotional systems (e.g., Montag et al., 2010a,b), main
effects of environmental factors as mentioned in this section and
most importantly the interaction effects between genetics and the
environment.
To return to the importance of the study of primal emotional
systems for understanding complex human personality traits
such as the Big Five, we would simply note that the unique
personality of a person will be shaped by the strength of both
the tonic/phasic emotional bursts from the subcortical levels of
the brain, together with one’s ability to hold a tight grip on
the emotional activities (abilities in emotion regulation) – hence
cortical, top–down regulation. Unique patterns of individual
differences in both bottom–up motivational energy derived from
primary emotional systems together with individual differences
in top–down regulation capacities from higher cortical brain
regions, remain important keys to understand the developmental
creation and molding of human personalities. As an example
one could understand the angry personality type as a result of
tonic strong bursts from the ancient bottom–up RAGE circuitries
together with diminished cortical top–down control (compare
this with Siever’s, 2008 view).
A CLOSER LOOK AT PERSONALITY
FROM AN EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVE
The following section summarizes some critical points of Nettle’s
theory on why variation in personality still occurs. Going beyond
his thoughts we will add additional layers, especially primal
emotional systems as tools for survival to his model. Nettle’s
theory (Nettle, 2006) is strongly built on Darwin’s idea of natural
selection (Darwin, 1859/2008), which Charles Darwin among
others (and also Nettle, 2009; p. 54–78) illustrated with the
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FIGURE 2 | A modern view on human personality arising from individual differences in brain structure and functionality shaped by both genetics and
the environment (the brain image has been taken from Pixabay.net and is license free); moreover individual differences in bottom–up-emotional-
bursts in a concert with individual differences of top–down-regulation capacitites result in unique personality patterns.
famous Galapagos finches (see also Darwin’s Beagle diaries for
his first mentions of the finches; Darwin, 1839/2008). On various
Galapagos islands Darwin observed finches with different formed
beaks. Until our days there are large differences in beak size
to be registered between the finch populations of the different
Galapagos islands, but also variation of beak size on each island
is evident. This phenomenon can be explained by a principle
called fluctuation selection, ultimately helping a species (seen as a
whole) to survive in different environments. A key to understand
the different sizes of the finches’ beaks is the insightful idea
that the islands of Galapagos (and niches on the islands) differ
in what they offer in terms of food availability for the finches.
On islands and their niches with large and hard to crack seeds
those finches with large beaks would survive best, producing
the most offspring, because large beaks facilitate the cracking
of large seeds. On islands with small/soft seeds or worms to
be retrieved from crevices, finer beaks would be of advantage,
because large beaks would hinder getting at the smaller and
more hidden natural resources. Hence, on islands with smaller
seeds and worms, finches with smaller beaks would be better
able to find food and as a consequence produce more offspring
(see for additional new insights the work by De León et al.,
2014). Although this all is very logical, many critical questions
remain: If on one island large beaks seem to be better and
small beaks on others, why is there still some variation in the
size of the large/small beaks on each island? Natural selection
could easily have chosen a winning solution on every island,
favoring ultimately and for all times large or small beaks. A key
to understand the variation remaining on each island has been
addressed by the so called trade-off model. A trait such as a
small/large beak comes with advantages and disadvantages (as
we have seen each beak is only optimal for retrieval of certain
foods). What is to one’s advantage in a finch population at
a given time, can change rapidly with weather fluctuations. It
has been shown that changes in the climate of an island can
change the availability of certain kinds of food. Therefore, in
times of a drought, an island, which beforehand may have
advantaged finches with small beaks (with plenty availability of
small/soft seeds), may now make food more available for birds
with larger beaks (as only large hard seeds remain as food; see
Grant and Grant, 1989)3. For example, due to droughts and
the resulting diminished availability of certain foods, finches
with the larger beaks from the beak population may have better
3In their work they speak of long-billed and deep beaks. We stay with our
terminology small/large for reasons of simplicity.
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chances for survivial, because they can now better access the
available food: “This selection event was followed by another
favoring birds with deep beaks capable of extracting the only
available food, arthropods from beneath the bark of trees and
within Opuntia trunks and old pads.” (Grant and Grant, 1989,
p. 377). Variation in the beak size on each island’s finch
population therefore promoted the overall survival of sub-species
with certain characteristics. The term fluctuation selection (see
also Nettle, 2009, p. 64) illustrates that not always is the same trait
associated with higher survival, but rather that the trait that is best
adapted varies with environmental changes.
As Nettle postulates, this idea can be transfered to human
personality. Different kinds of personality traits come with
different advantages or disadvantages. Again, this ultimately
depends on the kind of natural and social environment we
are dealing with. When homo sapiens started to populate (and
“conquer”) the world out of Africa about 60–70,000 years ago,
they were facing different environments in terms of fauna
and climate. Therefore, variation in traits such as personality
may have helped our species to better adjust to different
environments, both physical as well as social. To illustrate this,
let us choose an example with neurotic vs. emotional stable or
extraverted vs. introverted persons. In dangerous environments
the neurotic person will have an advantage, because he/she is
more careful in monitoring the (social) environment and as a
consequence will face less often immediate dangers compared
with an emotional stable person (ergo survival is more likely in
neurotics; see also Denissen and Penke, 2008a,b). In contrast,
when the environment is safe, the neurotic person may spend
personal emotional resources on monitoring a safe environment
which might be better invested in the search for food or
a mating partner. Here, the emotional stable, but perhaps
also the extraverted person, has an advantage. This specific
possibility is nicely supported by empirical data showing that
extraverts have more children and more mating partners, but
are also more prone to end up in the hospital due to accidents
(Nettle, 2005; see for more recent literature in this area the
overview provided by Penke and Jokela, 2016). In Table 1 on
page 628 of Nettle’s paper from 2006, such trade-offs for each
personality trait out of the Big Five of Personality approach are
described. We briefly summarize them here: Being extraverted
comes with advantages in mating success and building social
alliances, but also potential disadvantages such as taking higher
physical risk accompanied perhaps by less family stability. Open
persons are more creative with putative positive effects on
their attractiveness, but people who are extremely high on
the Openness dimension may be more prone to psychosis or
unusual beliefs. Agreeable persons come with the advantage of
having positive and functional relationships, but they often can
be exploited by others for their high empathy and goodness.
Hence they may not be able to maximize personal profits as low
agreeable persons might do (for an example from agreeableness
and stuttering, see Jafari et al., 2015). Neuroticism comes
along with higher attention/monitoring of potential dangerous
situations, but also higher proneness for affective disorders.
Finally, high Conscientiousness has long term benefits in the
area of health behavior and longevity, but conscientious persons
might also become overly obsessed with details, thereby miss
some immediate easy access to available reward.
We argue, beyond the ideas advanced by Nettle (2006, 2009),
to also consider variation in primal emotions to better understand
the summarized trade-off models, because (i) such states of mind
have been strongly shaped by evolution and we have argued
here (ii) that affective strengths and weaknesses are essential
parts of human personality. Therefore trade-offs arising from
different strengths of bottom–up operating primal emotions and
top–down cognitive strategies might be important to understand
the postulated trade-offs by Nettle for the Big Five personality
dimensions.
We summarized in Table 4 why evolution may have favored
the solution of seven inbuilt primal emotional systems in our
mammalian brains. Beyond the evolutionary necessicity of each
primal emotional system, it is also noteworty that individual
differences in brain structure and function of these emotional
circuits could result in different strengths/activities with which
each primal emotional system usually operates. The above
mentioned example of the neurotic person can be well described
by a more arousable FEAR system which may drive neurotic
behaviors (see Figure 1). The extraverted person might be pushed
toward one side of the trade-off due to a high PLAY system and
so forth.
But again, variations of primary emotional systems underlying
individual differences in personality are important from an
evolutionary perspective: For instance, not all constellations
of primal emotional systems operate successfully in a given
environment. Someone with a high active LUST system might use
the energy spend on the arousal of this system better in CAREing
for his/her already existing offspring instead of searching for
an extramarital affair (in this example we might also note how
SEEKING arousal might be hijacked by the LUST circuitry).
On a species level “different fitness optima of heritable variants
over time and space can maintain the heritable variation” (Buss,
2009, p. 362), hence it secures survival of a species. On an
individual level the situation could be a bit different. Although
the average fitness of the normal range of personality could be
equal (perhaps with the exception of the distribution extremes,
which might cause psychopathologies), each unique personality
might differ in their success to reach one’s own optimal fitness
given a non-optimal fit with a given environment (see als Nettle,
2006, p. 623). Therefore, all human beings need to find the right
social-environmental niches, where their intrinsic personality
variability, including the underlying primal emotions, operate
“best” (i.e., promote survival and thriving).
In sum, we believe some of the major driving forces of
Nettle’s trade-off personality model can be related directly to
strengths and weakness in the underlying primal emotions, as
they are “survival systems” constructed by a long evolutionary
selection process. Their fundamental structures were genetically
constructed (they are in-built unconditional affective-behavioral
networks within our brains). Variation of these systems across
species can enlarge or diminish the chances of survival of species
in specific environments (again, we are not speaking about
primary emotional systems being there or absent in terms of
absolute (1 or 0) function).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 April 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 464
fpsyg-08-00464 April 9, 2017 Time: 9:58 # 11
Montag and Panksepp Evolutionary Aspects of Personality
OUTLOOK: THE STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES IN RAW AFFECT IN
HUMANS
Summing up the arguments from this essay, we hope that many
readers will be encouraged to increasingly include measures of
primal emotional systems (aside from just the more established
personality measures) in their studies so as to better understand
human personality, namely in ways that can be connected to
neuroscientific issues. This can be achieved via many routes.
The easiest way to follow for many personality psychologists
represents the inclusion of the ANPS in their studies (Davis et al.,
2003; Davis and Panksepp, 2011) so as to have a self-report
measure which has been derived from rich evolutionary and
neuroscientific perspectives—a tool that has undergone several
validation studies in the past few years (e.g., Reuter et al., 2009;
Montag et al., 2016a,b; Sindermann et al., 2016).
The fact that the ANPS has been constructed on a
neuroscientific background brings along several advantages
compared to those based simply on lexically derived measures.
For biologically oriented psychologists, the use of these
measures holds the chance to indirectly hypothesize about the
neuroanatomical areas and brain chemistries of relevance for
various personality styles. For applicability see some recent works
in the context of facial expressions by Montag and Panksepp
(2016) or Internet addiction (Montag et al., 2016b). To illustrate
this briefly: The work of investigators interested in the study
of the biological basis of Neuroticism may be facilitated if they
better understand that the brain systems that may drive neurotic
behavior bottom–up, do this via FEAR, PANIC-SADNESS (and
to a lesser degree RAGE-ANGER) systems. Both activity in
the FEAR and SADNESS circuits can be downregulated by
brain opioids and oxytocin (Panksepp, 1992, 1998; Kirsch et al.,
2005). Therefore, the study of the neuropeptide oxytocin and
various endogenous opioids might be good key candidates to be
considered in such a research endeavor (e.g., with the prediction
that lower brain oxytocin and opioid levels may be associated
with higher anxiety, especially separation-anxiety?).
Nevertheless (and needless to say), self-report measures are
confounded by top–down brain activity via diverse tertiary-
process level from cognitive to cultural styles – namely our
cortical thinking cap, which can inhibit primal subcortical
emotional powers, at times may regulate and thereby modify (e.g.,
hold a tight grip on) our emotions. Furthermore, verbal reports
are only an indirect path to the study of one’s own emotionality.
Davis and Panksepp (2011, p. 1952) “interpret the ANPS scales
as tertiary (thought-mediated) approximations of the influence
of the various primary emotional systems in people’s lives.” The
same caveats hold for those aiming to study individual differences
in raw affect by experimental means. “Pure raw affect” can be
overriden by our prefrontally regulated and steered cognitions
and behavior action patterns. This makes it very difficult to study
individual differences in raw affective responses in humans, but
perhaps not impossible. We would like to give some examples for
already successful conducted research where more raw forms of
affect have been recorded: In adults the study of FEAR had made
some progress by using paradigms including the administration
of painful electric shocks. One of these paradigms was presented
by Mobbs et al. (2007). Here participants were put in a kind
of PacMan Game situation, where a predator was chasing the
participants. The application of the defensive distance model in
this experiment (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2001; McNaughton and
Corr, 2004) together with the administration of electric shocks on
the hand of the participants, when being caught by the predator,
led to a robust switch of more prefrontal monitoring brain
activity to “pure” FEAR activity being aroused, as characterized
by elevated activity in relevant brain stem regions (e.g., the
periaqueductal gray). Other studies used startle reflex paradigms
(e.g., Montag et al., 2008) to assess individual differences in
the FEAR/anxiety circuitry. Participants differ in their strength
of startle reactions to unpredictable administered acoustic loud
bursts, a response which obviously cannot be easy controlled by
subjects in such experiments. Of course, the study of raw affect in
TABLE 4 | Primary emotional systems as tools for survival.
Primary emotion Evolutionary tool for...
SEEKING (+) The SEEKING system provides mammals with psychological “energy” (i.e., enthusiasm) to explore the environment. This is necessary to find
mating partners as well as food to nourish both brain and body.
LUST (+) LUST activity is of importance to be attracted to the opposite sex and transfer one’s own genome (hence also of species homo sapiens) in
terms of offspring to the next generation.
CARE (+) Humans are social mammals. In social groups survival chances are higher. Moreover, taking CARE of one’s own offspring helps assure that
the young children grow into adults and themselves can have families.
PLAY (+) PLAY behavior is of importance to learn social competencies and motoric skills. This helps to get better along in complex social groups
when being an adult.
FEAR (−) Without a FEAR response (along with the learning it promotes) homo sapiens would not have optimal abilities to escape and avoid
dangerous situations and to carefully monitor the safety of their environments.
RAGE/ANGER (−) Activity of the RAGE system is observed when mammals are in need to defend themselves (when a predator is closing in), but also in
situations of frustration, when an expected reward is absent. RAGE activity is also visible to solve territorial conflicts in mammals.
SADNESS/PANIC (−) PANIC/SADNESS reflects separation distress and signals a situation of having lost contact with an important person or being lost in the
environment. As homo sapiens is a social animal, separation from a caregiver or another important person triggers a distress reaction
leading to distress vocalization (crying) to reunite with a partner or a parent. Ultimately, as with CARE, homo sapiens is stronger in groups
than when alone. CARE activities also can counteract and downregulate SADNESS arousal.
(+) positive primal emotions; (−) negative primal emotions.
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negative primal emotions brings along more ethical issues than
the study of positive emotions, which will remain a challenge for
university investigators and their ethics committees.
As outlined in this article, we currently have substantial
evidence for seven primary emotional systems, which can be
evoked by direct electrical stimulation of the brain, as well as
various pharmacological challenges to such emotional circuits
of mammalian brains. Some of these primal emotions are
harder to study than others in humans (just think about social
desirability issues when aiming at the study of the raw affect
of LUST). Individual differences in other primary emotional
systems might require sensitivity of age dependence issues: (i)
the separation distress/PANIC system is obviously more active
in young children. Such issues are also germane for the study of
individual differences in the PLAY circuitry. Young children love
to engage in joyful PLAY activity, therefore studying individual
differences in PLAY at pure action might be something to be
achieved best in the age range of 3–6 (where stable PLAY behavior
can be observed, see Scott and Panksepp, 2003). In general, the
study of raw affects in children is bound to be easier than in
adults, because the prefrontal brain area exerts less influence on
the ancient emotional circuitry. Of course, studies of negative
emotions in children are confronted by more profound ethical
issues than in adults. Of course, the study of raw affect in children
is of tremendous importance, because emotional disturbances
in childhood have the strongest effect on the development of
psychopathological disorders in adults. This is where studies of
animal models may be especially informative. Other possibilities
(which will give more causal insights into the relevance of
primary emotional systems for personality) unfortunately can
only be studied in a small group of patients. Anchoring electrodes
in areas such as the medial forebrain bundle (the SEEKING
system) to treat depression (Coenen et al., 2011; Schlaepfer et al.,
2013, 2014; Panksepp et al., 2014) will be also of interest to
understand how strong the personality of a patient changes due
to the brain stimulation. This approach would also match the
investigation of personality changes due to lesions in brain areas
where primary emotional systems are concentrated (see example
with stroke patients above by Farinelli et al., 2013).
Before concluding this paper we want to mention some
limitations of the present theoretical work. First of all, we
chose a rather narrow focus in the investigation of primary
emotional systems and personality. In the present work we
only highlighted the Affective Neuroscience (Panksepp, 1998)
perspective on primary emotional systems in the context of the
classic Big Five of Personality/Five Factor Model of Personality.
Clearly, many other important emotional perspectives could have
been chosen such as studying individual differences in emotion
recognition and production abilities referring to Ekman’s work
on basic emotions derived from faces in the context of personality
research. Interestingly this represents also a research area being
understudied right now. Please also see how Ekman’s emotion
theory (e.g., Ekman and Friesen, 1971) can be linked to
Panksepp’s work (Montag and Panksepp, 2016). Aside from
Ekman’s theory other emotional theories could have been the
focus of the present work such as Russell’s circumplex model
(Russell, 1980), which has been contrasted with Panksepp’s work
in Zachar and Ellis (2012) or other theorists such as Cal Izard
(e.g., Izard, 2009).
A further limitation needs to be named in the context of
our evolutionary discussion of personality and their underlying
primary emotional systems. E.g., an excellent overview has been
provided by Buss (2009) discussing individual differences in
personality also in light of the life-history and costly signal theory.
Moreover, we could have also addressed the principle of negative
frequency-dependent selection (the rare phenotype in a population
has a selective advantage such as a woman being able to choose
among many males in a population with few females), but we
refrained from doing this, because “it is in fact just a subcase of
the more general phenomenon of fluctuation selection” (Nettle,
2006, p. 625). Of note, personality and intelligence are usually
investigated as different phenotypes in psychology. The here-
discussed evolutionary balance selection criteria might work
best for personality and their underlying primary emotional
systems, but not for intelligence, where other approaches such as
mutation-selection-balance might represent the better approach
[Penke et al., 2007; please see for an update the new work by
Penke and Jokela (2016)]. For example, perhaps there is simply
no disadvantage in being “too” intelligent... but this remains an
open issue (e.g., the case of autistic savants).
In closing, we emphasize the importance of building a more
solid bridge between human and animal (mammalian) persona-
lity research. Such interdisciplinary discourse has diminished
markedly since human and animal research traditions parted
ways starting half a century ago. In any event, if we want to
understand our ancient evolutionary heritage, we have to link
individual differences in personality and raw affect that can be
studied in animal models as potentially informative of homol-
ogies in own brains. We obviously do not have as direct access
to such phylogenetically ancient brain systems in humans, except
perhaps in neurological studies (Panksepp, 1985). In closing, it
will also be worthwhile reconsidering the old works of Darwin
on facial expression in men and animals (Darwin, 1872/2008);
individual differences in facial emotional expressions, although
well studied, could represent a new way to get insights into the
dynamics of our human emotional personality dimensions (see
discussion in Montag and Panksepp, 2016).
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